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This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is 
desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an 
economist’s perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is 
there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ‘local loop’, or local access 
network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. 
The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the 
threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent’s competitive stance in the wholesale market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Telecommunications markets have known great turmoil during the last decade.
1 A 
major promise of the European liberalization process in the 1990s was the rollout of 
local access networks.
2 In fact, underlying the liberalization of telecommunications 
markets was the belief that technological progress would end the natural-monopoly 
nature  of  the  industry.  Given  the  high  expectations,  however,  the  rollout  of  local 
networks  has  been  disappointing  or  at  best  narrowly  targeted,  and  at  present 
throughout the European Union (EU), there is still relatively limited competition in 
the ‘local loop’. While operators found it worthwhile to connect offices in business 
districts and metropolitan areas, residential customers have been much less exposed to 
entrants with their own networks. Residential callers did, however, benefit from entry 
by firms without their own networks, purchasing capacity from incumbent operators 
and reselling it to end-users in order to offer  voice telephony services (known as 
‘Carrier Select’ services). Also, entry based on ‘local loop unbundling’ (LLU) did 
initially not demonstrate the growth that was expected.
3 
4 Nevertheless, it turned out 




To make LLU a success, regulatory frameworks have been set up in the EU to ensure 
that entrants can get access to key inputs from incumbents. However, incumbents do 
not have strong incentives to act in a cooperative manner, as it would result in more 
                                                   
1 See e.g. “Beyond the bubble: A survey of telecoms”, The Economist, 11 October 2003. 
2 Local access networks, also known as customer access networks, connect end-users’ devices 
to local switches. The transmission medium typically consists of wire (e.g. copper wire or 
optical fiber) or radio spectrum. 
3 Unbundling of the incumbent’s local acess network allows entrants to lease the incumbent's 
local lines in order to get access to end-users. 
4 It is important to note that if the success of certain entry modes has been limited, this is 
largely  in  comparison  to  policy  makers’  initial  expectations.  In  general,  there  exists  no 
objective benchmark to assess the timeliness and speed of adoption of new technologies. 
Instead of regulatory ineffectiveness, the slow pick-up of LLU might just as well be due to 
well-informed business decisions. 
5 See De Bijl and Peitz (2005) for an overview of LLU developments in Europe.   3 
intense competition. For instance, in the UK, LLU-based entrants offering broadband 
Internet access have accused incumbent BT of deliberately making the unbundling 
process  costly  and  difficult.  In  the  light  of  these  types  of  incentive  problems, 
questions  have  been  raised  about  the  effectiveness  of  regulation  aiming  at  the 
development of LLU-based entry.
6 
 
It is widely accepted that behavioral regulation, such as regulating wholesale access 
prices, has its limitations.
7 For instance, regulators are not perfectly informed about 
incumbents’  cost  levels,  information  which  is  needed  to  select  optimal  regulated 
prices. Also, designing regulation is a complex matter, requiring substantial time and 
effort without guaranteeing that regulatory interventions are optimal. Therefore, it has 
been  suggested  in  policy  discussions  that  it  may  be  better  to  directly  change 
incumbents’ incentives, rather than trying to control their behavior (see OECD, 2002; 
Ofcom, 2004). One way to do this is to vertically separate the regulated firm into 
monopoly part and a competitive part (‘structural separation’). Accordingly, given the 
limitations of behavioral regulation, a central question is whether the effectiveness of 
LLU can be increased in a more drastic way, compared to adapting and fine-tuning 
existing regulation. As a case in point, in 2004 the UK communications regulator 
Ofcom assessed whether structural separation of BT’s infrastructure from its retail 
activities  could  perhaps  deal  with  the  alleged  advantages  for  BT  Retail  when 
purchasing services from BT Wholesale. In order to pre-empt a possible break-up, BT 
offered to reduce wholesale prices for accss to its local network.
8 
 
This paper presents a basic framework that can be used to assess whether (mandatory) 
structural separation is desirable in a given market. This framework is illustrated in 
the European context of the market for fixed telecommunications (voice and Internet 
access), but it can, in principle, also be applied to other industries, such as electricity, 
post, railways, and financial markets. The underlying approach is that before deciding 
on the introduction of structural separation, a crucial question needs to be addressed: 
                                                   
6 See e.g. OECD (2000). 
7 See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (2000). 
8 See “BT ducks break-up with price cuts”, BBC News, 23 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/business/4122060.stm.   4 
is there a persistent bottleneck? Within the context of this paper: is local access a 
persistent  bottleneck?
9  To  address  this  question,  the  following  definition  of  a 
bottleneck will be used: an input to a production process, such as a certain part of a 
network, is a (monopolistic) bottleneck – or equivalently, an essential facility – if it is 
essential to provide services to end-users, and it cannot be economically reproduced, 
typically because of substantial sunk costs.
10 
 
To  offer  a  different  interpretation  of  the  decision  framework,  I  will  discuss  the 
example  of  Ofcom’s  considerations  to  split  BT  unless  it  gives  rivals  in  the  retail 
market (without local networks) ‘fair and equal’ access to its network. This example 
nicely  illustrates  that  this  type  of  framework  provides  a  set  of  options  that  the 
regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a forced break-up as a means to 
adjust an incumbent’s competitive stance in the wholesale market. It also illustrates 
the link (or stretch) between a regulator’s way of enforcing certain behavior in the 
market and its economic underpinnings. 
 
Some  related  papers  are  the  following.  In  a  paper  that  discusses  various  network 
industries and argues that different restructuring options are appropriate in different 
sectors,  Pittman  (2003b)  proposes  to  motivate  decisions  about  restructuring  of 
industries by addressing the benefits from competition after entry in the product stage, 
the extent of scope economies between the production and the network stage, the 
difficulty of detecting and preventing discrimination by network operators, and the 
harm from discrimination to competition and welfare. The framework suggested in 
my  paper  is  compatible  with  Pittman’s  guiding  questions.  Cave  (2003)  discusses 
structural separation in the context of postal markets and presents a similar decision 
tree that assesses the case for structural separation. Crandall and Sidak (2002) discuss 
several  cases  of  structural  separation  in  the  US.  They  argue  that  (mandatory) 
structural  separation  leads  to  substantial  costs  in  terms  of  forgone  coordination 
                                                   
9  It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  a  second  main  strand  of  structural  separation  in 
telecommunications, namely between local and long distance services. This type of separation 
has been very relevant in the US. See e.g. Faulhaber (2003) for an overview. This paper also 
abstracts from call termination as a bottleneck. 
10 See Knieps (2002).   5 
benefits and economies of scope, and that the observed failures of entrants flow from 
defects in their own strategies, rather than from anticompetitive behavior. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual starting 
points of the paper. First, it presents a simple definition of vertical separation and 
briefly  discusses  the  costs  and  benefits  of  structural  separation  (subsection  2.1). 
Second, on a stylized level it presents different modes of entry and competition, and 
discusses their welfare implications both in the short and the long run (subsection 
2.2). Section 3 then provides a rudimentary framework to assess whether structural 
separation  may  lead  to  a  higher  welfare  level  (section  3.1).  Next,  it  discusses  an 





2.1 The rationale behind the notion of vertical  separation 
 
There are many defitions of structural or vertical separation, ranging from setting up 
‘Chinese walls’ between monopoly parts and competitive parts (leading to accounting 
separation), to ‘physically’ breaking up a company into parts without ties between 
them  (leading  to  full  ownership  separation).  An  extensive  overview  of  different 
modes of separation is provided in OECD (2003). For the purposes of this paper, a 
generic  notion  of  separation  will  be  used:  structural  separation  means  that  an 
integrated firm, that is, a firm that operates a network and provides services over it, is 
split into: 
 
(i)  a company owning the local access network, providing wholesale access (the 
network operator); and 
(ii)  the  rest  of  the  company,  providing  retail  services,  and  possibly  operating 
those  parts  of  the  network  that  do  create  problems  of  anticompetitive 
behavior, such as long-distance networks (the service provider).  
 
The central idea of this stylized definition is that the incumbent’s retail operations are 
put in a position similar to that of entrants who do not have a local access network.   6 
Accordingly,  the  newly  created  service  provider  has  to  lease  local  lines  from  the 
network operator, just like LLU-based entrants. 
 
Structural separation has several potential or claimed benefits and costs.
11 Arguably, 
the main benefit of separation is non-discriminatory access for all operators without 
local networks. Separation eliminates the incumbent’s retail operation’s ability and 
incentives to discriminate in the downstream market. In particular, it eliminates the 
incumbent’s  incentives  and  possibilities,  whether  legal,  economic  or  technical,  to 
raise the costs of its rival firms by reducing quality or increasing the cost of access, 
which would lead to ‘double marginalization’ and hence an inefficiency. On a more 
general level, the scope for anticompetitive practices and leverage of market power 
into related markets, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), may be reduced. In 
particular, structural separation may make the prevention of cross-subsidization more 
effective and make reliable cost information about the incumbent’s non-competitive 
activities more readily available. Furthermore, the idea is that regulation in the non-
bottleneck parts of the value chain becomes simpler, more effective, and less costly. 
Not only are firms that are not vertically integrated easier to monitor, anticompetitive 
behavior is much less likely to occur. Another argument in favor of separation is that 
is allows for the coordination of investments between all service providers and the 
network  operator,  rather  than  only  between  the  incumbent’s  network  and  retail 
activities. 
 
There are also several potential and claimed costs to structural separation. Splitting an 
integrated operator is likely to be a difficult process. For instance, where should one 
draw  the  line?  It  may  not  be  straightforward  to  determine  at  which  level  in  the 
network hierarchy, and where exactly in a switch, the separation should be made. 
Also, in itself separation is a very drastic, disruptive and costly intervention, while 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  it  will  lead  to  the  desired  outcome.  In  particular,  it  is 
                                                   
11  See  e.g.  Ofcom  (2004).  Crandall  and  Sidak  (2002)  and  OECD  (2003)  contain  more 
extensive discussions on this topic. In a different context, Mulder et al. (2005) analyze the 
costs and benefits of separation implied by the proposal by the Dutch Minister of Economic 
Affairs  to  replace  legal  unbundling  in  the  energy  distribution  industry  by  ownership 
unbundling.   7 
uncertain if regulation will really become more effective and simple. Next, separating 
a vertically integrated operator eliminates the coordination benefits, as well as the 
economies  of  scale  and  scope,  that  accrue  from  vertical  integration.  As  a 
consequence,  it  may  lead  to  delays  in  investments.  For  example,  coordinating 
investments  in  the  network  between  the  new  (separated)  parties  may  become 
problematic,  given  that  innovations  in  services  may  require  investments  in 
competitive as well as non-competitive activities. This type of coordination plays, for 
instance, a large role in the railways sector.
12 Furthermore, separation may lead to a 
crystallization of market power in the access market, which may distort the rollout of 
alternative  networks.  Also,  given  that  separation  is  a  costly  and  time-consuming 
affair,  it  may  raise  the  cost  level  of  the  incumbent  operator.  In  particular,  the 
incumbent faces costs to reorganize, although it is hard to say in general whether 
these costs are substantial. Another example of a cost increase is that an integrated 
firm may have a lower cost of capital, that is, a lower cost of attracting funds. Thus, 
although  structural  separation  eliminates  all  possibilities  to  raise  rivals’  costs,  it 
introduces  new  possibilities  to  do  so,  by  increasing  the  incumbent’s  rather  than 
entrants’ costs. 
 
The necessary cost-benefit analysis in a given situation will neither be easy nor lead to 
a simple, unambiguous result. Ofcom (2004) argues that the arguments in favor of and 
against  structural  separation  are  “finely  balanced”,  while  practical  considerations 
suggest that it may be wise to avoid the cost and disruption of a break-up. As noted in 
OECD (2003), there exists little evidence that the benefits of vertical separation of the 
local access network loop are sufficiently larger than its costs; moreover, the outcome 
of separation is uncertain while the costs may turn out to be large. However, should 
policy makers simply weigh the costs and benefits of structural separation, and based 
on the outcome, decide whether to go ahead with it, or is there more to it? Given the 
potential costs and uncertainties mentioned above, one should at least think twice. 
One  also  has  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  structural  separation  will  keep  the 
bottleneck status – if any – of local access intact. Overall, before initiating a cost-
benefit  analysis,  one  should  assess  exactly  under  which  conditions  structural 
                                                   
12 Pittman (2003a).   8 
separation makes sense in the first place. A central point is that these conditions are 
closely linked to the nature of competition. 
 
 
2.2 The nature of competition 
 
Although the issue of vertical separation became prominent with the introduction of 
competition in markets for fixed voice telephony, we adopt a somewhat broader view 
and consider markets for fixed telephony and Internet access. A central question that 
underlies privatization, liberalization, and more specific structural policy interventions 
such as separation, is whether competition, and what type of competition, is feasible 
at all in the market for fixed telecommunications. Do we just have to wait some more 
years  before  we  can  observe  fullfledged  competition  between  operators  with  their 
own networks? Or will some parts of the market always remain monopolistic, despite 
attempts by regulators to introduce competition? The answers to these questions are 
still  not  evident.  Recently,  for  instance,  Ofcom  (2004)  judged  that  competition  in 
fixed telecommunications is still fragile, despite a long history of regulation aiming at 
the creation of effective competition. 
 
To discuss the possibilities for competition, it makes sense to distinguish different 
modes  of  entry  and  competition.  Typically,  three  stylized  entry  modes  are 
distinguished in the market for fixed telecommunications: (1) facilities-based entry: 
entrants roll out their own networks, including local access networks; (2) LLU-based 
entry:  entrants,  who  may  roll  out  their  own  long-distance  networks,  lease  local 
connections from the incumbent; and (3) Carrier Select-based entry: entrants, who 
may roll out their own long-distance networks, purchase originating access from the 
incumbent to allow their customers to originate calls. Whereas facilities-based entry 
implies complete network rollout, ‘pure’ cases of LLU-based entry and Carrier Select-
based entry would involve partial or no infrastructure investment with regard to local 
access networks.
13 Hence, the latter two entry modes can be grouped together under 
the label ‘access-based’ entry, although this does not do justice to the possibity that 
                                                   
13 LLU-based entry typically involves more investments than Carrier Select, because of the 
necessary technical adaptions at the level of local switches.   9 
such entrants may actually invest substantially in their networks, for instance at the 
long-distance level, or selectively (targeting particular users) at the local level. One 
should therefore be aware that the distinction above does not explicitly recognize the 
wide variety in entry opportunities that can be observed in the real world. Applied 
entry strategies include, for instance, combinations of network rollout in metropolitan 
areas aimed at business customers and LLU-based access to residential end-users. 
 
In  a  recent  speech,  former  European  Commissioner  Mr  Monti  warned  against 
phrasing the discussion in terms of facilities-based versus access-based competition: 
 
“The debate, it seems, is between those who advocate a facilities-based model 
of competition on one side, and those who advocate a model of competition 
based on access on the other side. [...] I believe that there is not necessarily a 
contradiction  between  access-based  and  facilities-based  competition. 
Competition would never be able to develop, in the short term, if entrants were 
not able to gain access to the incumbent operator’s network to start offering 
services.” (Monti, 2003; emphasis in the original.) 
 
Although  using  a  black-and-white  distinction  can  be  misleading,  distinguishing 
different entry modes can be very useful, and is probably necessary, to structure the 
discussion  in  terms  of  fine-tuning  regulation  that  takes  into  account  entrants’ 
incentives to invest.
14 The usefulness for policy purposes of making such a distinction 
is implicitly confirmed in the following remark: 
 
“However, it must also be that, in the longer term, the regulatory framework 
should privilege operators which base their competitive advantage on building 
their own infrastructure, simply because they are those who are likely to best 
improve the competitive conditions of the market.” (Monti, 2003.) 
 
To allow for this type of intervention, one has to make a distinction between different 
types of entrants. In this example, to design a regulatory framework that over time 
                                                   
14 See, for instance, De Bijl and Peitz (2002) and Valletti (2003), for analyses and discussions 
of access and retail regulation in different entry modes.   10 
increases entrants’ incentives for network rollout, one should not ignore that entrants 
may lean stronger towards access-based operations or towards a strategy aiming at 
building  their  own  infrastructure.  In  particular,  which  type  of  strategy  an  entrant 
follows will heavily depend on the regulatory regime in the first place. 
 
As a helpful thought experiment, let me discuss the welfare implications of different 
entry  modes.
15  Note  first  that  facilities-based  entry  results,  by  definition,  in 
‘infrastructure competition’ (or ‘network competition’), whereas access-based entry 
leads  to  ‘services  competition’.
16  The  former  type  of  competition  implies  that 
competitors have their own (local) infrastructure. The latter one implies that entrants 
offer services to end-users but do not have their own networks, or at least not the 
bottleneck parts of networks.  
 
Important  consequences  of  infrastructure  competition  are  that  it  results  in  a  level 
playing field between incumbent and entrants, that it allows for more innovation by 
entrants, and that it does not erode incumbents’ incentives to upgrade and maintain 
their  own  networks,  as  there  is  no  ‘free  riding’  by  entrants.  As  a  consequence, 
infrastructure competition typically leads to a higher welfare level in the longer run: 
dynamic efficiency is increased. A possible inefficiency of infrastructure competition, 
however, is the waste involved in duplicative sunk investments. Services competition, 
on  the  other  hand,  results  relatively  quickly  in  intensified  competition  and  hence 
lower prices for consumers. It also avoids duplicative investments in networks. These 
factors  are  good  for  static  efficiency  in  the  short  run.  Drawbacks  are,  first,  that 
relatively little effort  and commitment – both in terms of innovation and investment – 
are required from entrants, and second, that entrants depend heavily on regulation. 
Resale or access-based business models may also limit the scope for innovation by 
entrants,  since  the  incumbent’s  existing  infrastructure  is  restrictive  (in  terms  of 
technological  possibilities  and  efficiency  levels)  compared  to  a  network  that  is 
                                                   
15 Throughout the paper, welfare is defined as the sum of producers surplus and consumers 
surplus. 
16  See  also  Cave  and  Vogelsang  (2003)  for  a  discussion  on  infrastructure  and  services 
competition.   11 
designed  from  scratch.
17 It  can  also  be  argued  that  services  competition deters  or 
delays  infrastructure  competition.
18  In  particular,  this  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
economies of scope between the upstream and downstream sector may deteriorate, so 
that the network operator no longer reveives correct incentives for maintaining and 
upgrading its network if it is not active in the production stage.
19 Services competition 
may  therefore  lead  to  lower  dynamic  efficiency.  Finally,  services  competition  not 
only  requires  that  a  heavy  apparatus  of  fine-tuned,  asymmetric  access  regulation 
remains in place, but also tends to lead to a form of competition that relies heavily on 
regulation. For instance, withdrawing a regulatory regime of open access can easily 
force entrants that focus on reselling and marketing telephony services to leave the 
market. 
 
Overall, services competition tends to lead to higher static efficiency in the short run, 
but it strongly depends on the regulatory framework, while infrastructure competition 
tends to lead to more innovation and higher dynamic efficiency in the longer run, with 
less  need  of  regulatory  intervention.  Dynamic  efficiency  seems  to  be  the  most 
important factor that determines welfare gains, due to the fact that it leads to more 
drastic and long-term increases of welfare.
20 Accordingly, it seems safe to say that 
infrastructure competition will lead to higher welfare in the longer run (although one 
should somewhat careful, given that network duplication can be wasteful). 
 
It is important to note that network rollout takes time, so that typically the benefits for 
consumers  do  not  materialize  immediately.  Hence  services  competition  can  be  a 
                                                   
17 Crandall and Sidak (2002) argue, based on empirical observations in the US, that entrants 
that build their own networks are more likely to generate revenues and survive than entrants 
that rely on access. 
18 See Bourreau and Doğan (2004). 
19 This is important in railways (see Pittman, 2003a, b). 
20 See e.g. Bourreau en Doğan (2001). See Hausman (1997) for a case study on the long-run 
welfare effects of innovation. De Bijl et al. (2003) discuss network and services competition 
in postal markets.   12 
necessary stepping stone during the transition towards infrastructure competition.
21 
The  emergence  of  successful  operators  may  take  several  years,  while  the 
Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’ can lead to bankruptcy of entrants 
along the way. Thus, patience and determination from politicians, policy makers and 
regulators  are  required.  Regulators,  in  addition,  must  actively  make  themselves 
redundant over time, for example by committing to ‘sunset clauses’ that trigger the 
withdrawal  of  certain  types  of  regulation  at  pre-defined  events.  From  a  political 
economy viewpoint, this may not happen automatically, as regulators may be not be 
eager to reduce their workload. 
 
To  conclude,  the  bottom  line  of  the  discussion  above  is  that  infrastructure 
competition, if it is feasible, tends to be superior to services competition. Although it 
may lead to inefficient duplication of networks, it does give rise to greater potentials 
for competition and innovation, which will have their payoffs for dynamic efficiency 
in the longer run. In this respect, the main question that underlies the desirability of 
structural separation is whether infrastructure competition is feasible. This is the topic 
of the next section. 
 
 
3. Policy framework 
 
3.1 A framework for assessing the desirability of structural separation 
 
The stylized comparison between network competition and services competition (see 
the previous section) naturally raises the question whether market characteristics are 
such that network competition is feasible. By definition this is the case if the cost 
characteristics of network elements and the market characteristics related to demand 
and the nature of competition, make it possible that two or more firms, each one with 
its own facilities, can co-exist in a competitive market. 
 
                                                   
21 For an extensive analysis of the types of access regulation that are best to safeguard LLU-
based entry and at the same time give entrants inventives to roll out their own networks, see 
De Bijl and Peitz (2002).   13 
From an economist’s perspective, the desirability of structural separation is subject to 
the  welfare  implications of  the  types  of  competition  that  can  emerge  in  a  certain 
market.  In  particular,  mandating  vertical  separation  makes  sense  if  it  increases 
welfare. Accordingly, based on the reasoning in the previous section, there is no need 
for structural separation if the market allows for network competition. Put differently, 
structural separation makes sense only if local access is a bottleneck or an essential 
facility, that is, if it is essential to provide services to end-users, and it cannot be 
economically  reproduced  because  of  substantial  sunk  costs.  Since  technological 
change may eliminate the bottleneck nature of certain network elements, one should 
add the condition that bottlenecks will remain persistent, or at least are expected to do 
so  with  a  large  likelihood.  The  latter  condition  is  especially  relevant  in 
telecommunications, a market which is characterized by rapid technogical change.  
 
Note  that  bottlenecks  must  be  distinguished  from  ‘natural’  entry  barriers,  such  as 
those resulting from economies of scale and scope. The latter type of barriers make 
entry more difficult or costly, but need not preclude it, while bottlenecks pose, by 
definition,  insurmountable  barriers  for  entrants.  Many,  if  not  most,  markets  have 
natural-monopoly characteristics (i.e., costs are sub-additive, or there are economies 
of scale), but this does not mean that there are bottlenecks or that competition is not 
viable. For example, postal markets exhibit strong economies of scale, but without 
substantial  sunk  costs  that  result  in  bottlenecks.
22  Experience  in  several  countries 
demonstrates that facilities-based competition is a realistic option in the postal sector. 
As far as is allowed by legislation, various postal markets have seen entry by firms 
taking care of sorting and delivering themselves, sometimes even on a nation-wide 
scale. This is quite different in the markets for electricity and gas, where economies of 
scale and sunk costs of the distribution network do not allow for more than one firm 
being active in distribution. 
 
The presence of a persistent bottleneck is not sufficient to make a case for structural 
separation, since one should also assess why the existing regulatory regime is not 
                                                   
22 The value chain in the postal sector consists of mail collection, transport, sorting, and 
delivery. See De Bijl et al. (2003). Postal boxes may be an exception, though, as they may 
constitute a bottleneck.   14 
effective. Since separation is a costly and risky intervention, improvement of current 
regulation  should  always  considered  before  taking  drastic  measures.  Here,  it  is 
important to note that an assessment of the quality of the regulatory regime should not 
ignore the goals set by the regulator. For instance, is the regulator trying to maximize 
welfare, or perhaps just aiming at the creation of competition in the short run? In the 
latter case, it is likely that there is substantial scope for improvement, as competition 
as a goal in itself is likely to conflict with the maximization of welfare. Note also that 
a practical problem of assessing the quality of the regulatory framework is that there 
may  not  be  a  good  benchmark.  How  can  one  assess  whether  the  effectiveness  of 
regulation can be improved? Perhaps experience in other countries provides help, but 





Figure 1: Guiding principles for structural separation. 
   15 
If local access is a persistent bottleneck and assuming that the existing regulatory 
regime already is as effective as it can be, then structural separation can be an option. 
Having  arrived  at  that  point,  a  cost-benefit  analysis  is  called  for.  Figure  3.1 
summarizes the policy maker’s decision problem as we have discussed it so far.
23 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the key issue is the assesment of the bottleneck-nature of 
local access. Such an assessment may not be easy, unfortunately, as it depends on a 
range of different parameters related to cost, demand, technological and institutional 
characteristics. The cost structure of local access is perhaps the most important factor 
that is involved. If the investment for network rollout are substantial and involve a 
large sunk cost, then it is more likely that there is a bottleneck. Cost characteristics do 
not exist in a vacuum, though. They depend to a large extent on the population density 
and  geographical  characteristics.  For  instance,  rolling  out  a  local  access  network 
typically involves less costs (per end-user) in a metropolitan area, where consumers 
are located closely to one another, than in a rural area. Furthermore, local access 
based on existing technologies may happen to be a bottleneck now, but technological 
change may drastically change the cost characteristics of local access networks. In 
fact, such technologies already exist, think for instance of wireless networks. 
 
Demand characteristics also play an important role. The willingness to pay and nature 
of demand for telecommunications services determines the future revenues from the 
investment.  Since  business  customers  usually  require  more  services  and  demand 
higher  ‘quantities’  than  residential  customers,  investing  in  a  network  will  not  be 
equally attractive for different segments of the market. Indeed, since the liberalization 
of telecoms markets, network rollout has been narrowly targeted: operators found it 
most worthwhile to connect offices in business districts and metropolitan areas, while 
residential  customers  have  been  much  less  exposed  to  entrants  with  their  own 
networks. 
 
Finally, the institutional environment can have an important impact on the feasilibity 
of network competition. In particular, the goals, views and beliefs of policy makers 
and  regulators,  and  how  they  translate  into  current  and  (expected)  future  access 
                                                   
23 See Cave (2003) and Ministry of Economic Affairs (2000) for related frameworks.   16 
regimes,  are  crucial  for  the  investment  climate.  For  instance,  Henisz  and  Zelner 
(2001) find, in an empirical study, that a low level of infrastructure deployment in a 
country may not mean that the market potential has remained untapped, but rather 
indicates a substantial risk of expropriation by the government. Within the context of 
this paper, the regulatory regime may discourage or even prevent firms from investing 
in network rollout.
24 Suppose, for example, that facilities-based entry is, in principle, 
profitable  for  a  certain  number  of  entrants.  If  the  regulator  enforces  a  mandatory 
access regime combined with artificially low access prices, then those entrants lose 
their incentives to roll out networks themselves. Thus, if the regulator believes that 
network competition is not feasible, and for that reason imposes network access at 
low access prices, then the belief of the regulator becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In addition, a regulator may want to stimulate services competition independent of the 
existence of bottlenecks, in order to show that regulation is effective in the short run. 
More generally, whether a regulator wants to promote competition, secure low prices 
for consumers, or encourage the rapid deployment of infrastructure will indirectly be 
an important determinant for operators’ incentives to invest. 
 
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to present a complete framework for the 
identification of bottlenecks, the discussion above provides some guidelines. First, 
unsegmented  structural  separation  is  unlikely  to  be  fully  effective,  as  it  ignores 
fundamental  differences  that  may  exist  across  segments.  In  particular,  one  should 
distinguish  segments  according  to  population  density,  geographical  characteristics, 
and  different  customers  types  (e.g.  corporate  and  residential  customers).  Any 
assessment of bottlenecks will depend on the characteristics of the  segments. The 
importance of geography suggests that structural separation may be an option in some 
areas but not in others, resulting in regional network operators. The extent to which 
regionally limited structural separation is technically feasible is another question, one 
that needs to be addressed in this type of situation. Second, since the  bottleneck-
                                                   
24 Crandall and Sidak (2002) argue that in the US, investments by entrants in residential areas 
have occurred at a slower rate than in business areas because of regulatory distortions. In 
particular,  mandatory  unbundling  at  artificially  low  prices  encourage  entrants  to  rely  on 
incumbents’ facilities, and to ‘wait and see’ before investing. These empirical observations 
confirm that mandatory access may distort firms’ investment decisions.   17 
nature  is  intertwined  with  policy  and  regulatory  choices,  one  has  to  neutralize 
feedback effects by conceptualizing a hypothetical regime without mandatory access. 
This thought experiment, in which entry based on resale is ruled out by definition, 
provides a useful starting point for the analysis. It allows one to filter out policy-
makers’ and regulators’ beliefs about the feasibility of network competition, as well 
as their goals (e.g. to stimulate services competition in the short run). 
 
 
3.2 Strategic use of the framework by regulators and policy makers 
 
In a recent consultation, Ofcom (2004) proposed three options in order to deal with 
the fragile nature of competition in fixed telecoms in the UK: (1) remove sector-
specific  regulation  and  rely  on  competition  law;  (2)  make  a  referral  to  the 
Competition Commission in order to trigger a legal investigation on the desirability of 
imposing  structural  remedies,  in  particular  structural  separation  of  BT;  and  (3) 
improve regulation dealing with bottlenecks so that “real equality of access”, that is, 
competitors getting the same quality and price of access as BT’s retail arm, will result. 
Although Ofcom stated that it would like to step back and let the competitive process 
do the work, it argued  that there  remain  enduring bottlenecks that  call for  access 
regulation. Ofcom argues that, as the arguments in favor of and against structural 
separation are balanced, it is most practical and wise to avoid separation, and instead 
aim at more effective regulation of access. Accordingly, Ofcom suggests a decision 
process along the lines of figure 3.1, but interestingly, with a twist. 
 
Before eliminating the option of separation, Ofcom expresses the desire to see “[...] 
real evidence of progress towards a regime which guarantees real equality of access” 
(Ofcom, 2004; p. 63). Effectively, the three options set out by Ofcom boiled down to 
a  choice  between  a  change  by  BT  in  its  behavior  towards  competitors  or  facing 
structural  separation  of  its  wholesale  and  retail  businesses.  Thus  Ofcom  uses  the 
threat  of  a  forced  break-up  as  a  means  to  adjust  BT’s  competitive  stance  in  the 
wholesale market. This example suggests an alternative interpretation of figure 3.1. 
When  assessing  whether  the  existing  regulatory  framework  can  be  improved,  the 
threat of separation can actually be a way of making the incumbent ‘behave’. In this 
sense,  the  framework  in  the  previous  subsection  creates  a  set  of  options  that  the   18 
regulator can use strategically, in order to influence BT’s decisions. Although it may 
be too early to judge the effectiveness of the latter approach, it is interesting to note 
that BT responded to Ofcom’s proposal by offering to reduce wholesale broadband 
prices and open its network to competitors.
25 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts a simplification of the game played by Ofcom and BT, starting at 
the  moment  after  Ofcom  announced  that  it  was  seriously  considering  structural 
separation.
26 It is depicted in the ‘extensive-form’ representation known from game 
theory, the standard toolbox to analyze strategic behavior.
27 First, at the node in the 
top of the game tree, the incumbent faces a choice between discriminating in the 
wholesale access market, and providing access  on equal terms to all. Next, if the 
incumbent  chooses  to  hinder  entrants,  the  regulator  chooses  between  structural 
separation of the incumbent and leaving it intact. If the incumbent chooses not to 





Figure 3.2: The regulatory game. 
                                                   
25 See “BT offers equal access to rivals”, BBC News, 3 February 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/business/4233121.stm. 
26  By  ‘seriously’,  I  mean  that  it  was  likely  that  Ofcom  would  follow  up  this  option  if 
necessary. Hence, I assume that Ofcom made a credible commitment. 
27 An ‘extensive-form game’ in game theory specifies the players, their moves, the timing of 
their moves, and their payoffs resulting from each possible combination of actions by the 
players.   19 
 
 
Also in the figure, the payoffs of the two players are given between brackets: at each 
end-node of the game, the incumbent’s payoff is on top, and the regulator’s payoff (in 
greek symbols) at the bottom. For the sake of illustration, the former are measured in 
terms of profits, and the latter in terms of social welfare effects and the reputation of 
being an effective regulator. The explanation of the notation is as follows: R denotes 
the incumbent’s profits in the retail market after vertical separation, W its profits in 
the wholesale market after vertical separation, and C the cost of separation incurred 
by the firm. Hence its total profits after a break-up are equal to R + W – C. Its profits 
in case it can hinder entrants without punishment are denoted by M, while N denotes 
the profits of an integrated incumbent that does not discriminate. Parameter α is the 
regulator’s  subjective  valuation  of  the  welfare  level  in  case  vertical  separation  is 
implemented in order to deal with discriminatory behavior by the incumbent, while 
parameter β denotes the regulator’s valuation of welfare in case the regulator does not 
punish such behavior. In the latter case, the regulator incurs a reputational loss of δ.
28 
Finally,  the  welfare  level  in  the  case  of  equal  access  provided  by  an  integrated 
incumbent is denoted by γ. Note that the regulator’s reputation remains unharmed if it 
breaks up an obstructing incumbent and if obstruction does not take place. Only if the 
incumbent  gets  away  with  anticompetitive  behavior,  the  regulator’s  reputation  for 
being an effective authority deteriorates. Natural conditions for the parameters are that 
M  >  N,  that  is,  without  punishment,  the  incumbent  has  an  incentive  to  obstruct 
entrants, and γ > β, that is, discrimination of entrants is assessed by the regulator as 
being bad for welfare. 
 
Let us consider how the game may be played. The way to ‘solve’ a game of this type 
is to start at the bottom,
29 which is the regulator’s decision node. Breaking up the 
incumbent is a credible threat if the reputation damage in the case of a market that 
                                                   
28 Additional notation is avoided by assuming that the regulator’s valuation of welfare levels 
and reputational losses are measured in the same units and can be added up without weight 
adjustments.  
29  The  underlying  idea,  known  in  game  theory  as  ‘subgame  perfection’,  is  that  in  each 
possible stage of the game, a player will make a decision that is best for him or her.   20 
doesn’t  work  well,  is  sufficiently  large,  or  if  the  welfare  loss  of  unpunished  bad 
behavior is sufficiently large. Stated in terms of the parameters, α ≥ β – δ.  Let us 
suppose that this is indeed the case, so that structural separation is indeed optimal 
after obstruction by the incumbent has taken place. Now we move up one step in the 
game tree, to the operator’s decision node. The incumbent expects that if it hinders 
entrants, it will be split and receive profits R + W – C. Hence, in order to prevent the 
operator from obstructing access, it must be that N ≥ R + W – C, that is, facilitating 
equal access and remaining an integrated operator is most profitable. The bottom line 
of this example is that the threat of separation is effective as a deterrent of access 
discrimination if the parameters are such that α ≥ β – δ and N ≥ R + W – C. If this is 
the  case,  then  the  pair  of  strategies  (“Provide  equal  access  for  entrants”,  “Split 
incumbent”)  forms  a  Nash  equilibrium  based  on  a  credible  threat.
30  Note  that  the 
action “Split incumbent” will not occur in the outcome of this equilibrium, but the 
regulator would not hesitate to go ahead with in case of obstruction by the incumbent. 
In the outcome of this equilibrium, the incumbent will provide equal access, so that 
the regulator no longer has to consider structural separation. 
 
Interpreting  the  regulatory  game  in  the  light  of  figure  3.1,  one  can  observe  that 
Ofcom’s use of the threat of separation ignores the fact that even though local access 
may  currently  inhibit  network  competition,  it  is  very  unlikely  to  be  a  persistent 
bottleneck. Ofcom seems to be unwilling to wait for the longer term, in which the 
problem may take care of itself as new technologies can be expected to erode BT’s 
monopoly in local access networks. Also, Ofcom apparently believes that there is no 
scope for regulatory improvement consisting of the development of more effective 
remedies against discrimination by BT – except, of course, if BT makes a first move 
towards organizational changes that can help to prevent discrimination. Arguably, the 
game has been played in line with the outcome of the Nash equilibrium described 
above. Recently, BT proposed (among others) to create a new access division, which 
                                                   
30 In a Nash equilibrium, no player can do better by choosing a different strategy, given the 
strategy chosen by the other. By starting at the bottom and going backward, actually we have 
constructed a ‘subgame perfect’ Nash equilibrium, which implies a Nash equilibrium in every 
‘subgame’.   21 




The example of Ofcom and BT provides a clear illustration of the strategic interaction 
between  a  regulator  and  an  incumbent  operator  in  a  situation  where  structural 
separation is considered as a realistic intervention. Of course, reality is more complex, 
with entrants participating in the game as well, and including BT’s plans for its ‘21st 
Century  Network’.  Nevertheless,  the  game  discussed  here  contains  the  crucial 
elements needed to assess Ofcom’s threat to influence BT’s behavior towards entrants 





Since network rollout takes considerable time and entrants initially lack a track record  
for quality, open access regimes and asymmetric access regulation can be useful in 
infant markets. However, superimposing a market structure for the longer run may be 
counterproductive. In particular, prolonged facilitation of resale-based entry may limit 
the options for entry and hence enforce existing monopolies. The potential damage of 
such an intervention can be quite large in industries with fast technological change 
where  the  nature  of  future  winning  technologies  is  unknown.  Hence,  regulatory 
intervention that directly interferes with market structure must be applied with a great 
amount  of  care.  Furthermore,  investing  in  telecommunications  assets  is  relatively 
risky. Think, for instance, of the unpredictability of demand (both in quantity and in 
nature), and about the high speed of technological change in ICT industries. Should 
policy makers try to reduce the risks faced by firms and investors? It will be obvious 
that it is socially optimal to reduce regulatory uncertainty to the minimum by creating 
a transparent and predictable regulatory environment. Nevertheless, interfering with 
                                                   
31 See “BT dodges break-up bullet”, ZDNet UK, 23 June 2005, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/ 
communications/0,39020336,39205238,00.htm;  and  Ofcom  (2005),  stating  that  it  “[...] 
considers  that  the  package  of  undertakings  offered  by  BT  is  appropriate  to  address  the 
difficulties which it has identified [...]”.    22 
the intrinsic risks of new technologies is likely to distort firms’ incentives to invest 
and enter new markets. This can be detrimental to social welfare. 
 
Structural separation raises similar concerns of interfering with market structure and 
the  risk  of  distorting  firms’  investment  decisions.  This  paper  underscores  the  key 
issue that underlies the case for structural or vertical separation, which is whether 
there is a persistent bottleneck with respect to local access. Since the answer depends 
on cost and demand characteristics of  different market segments, a simple and single 
answer  may  not  exist.  Moreover,  the  answer  is  interdependent  with  policy  and 
regulatory  views,  beliefs  and  choices.  For  segments  with  persistent  bottlenecks, 
structural separation may be an option, so that a cost-benefit analysis will be a natural 
step to follow, under the condition that the effectiveness of the current regulatory 
regime cannot be improved. 
 
The straightforward framework presented here that summarizes the main decisions to 
be made with regard to structural separation, applies, in principle, to any industry. 
Other network industries, such as electricity, railways and post immediately come to 
mind. In electricity markets, a priori it makes sense to completely separate transport 
and distribution from generation and retail activities. In the Netherlands, the Minister 
of Economic Affairs has proposed to do this, but without having done a cost-benefit 
analysis to verify if it leads to a substantial welfare increase that outweighs the cost of 
the  intervention.  The  major  postal  activities  (collection,  transport,  sorting  and 
delivery) are not characterized by bottlenecks, so post does not lend itself to access 
regulation or structural separation. Another example is provided by the markets for 
national  and  international  clearing  and  settlement  of  securities  transactions  (see 
European  Commission,  2002),  in  which  the  ‘book  entry’  function  of  securities 
depositories has characteristics of a bottleneck.
32 Hence it may be socially optimal to 
separate this function from the competitive parts involved in clearing and settlement, 
and  create  a  central  European  securities  depository  that  performs  the  book  entry 
function  at  a  regulated  price.  The  international  central  securities  depositories  that 
currently provide this function as part of a bundle of clearing and settlement services, 
                                                   
32 See Milne (2002).   23 
would then only be active in the markets for competitive services related to securities 
trade. 
 
Recall that this paper focused on the market for fixed voice telephony and Internet 
access. The relevance of this market delineation is that the local loop has been a 
bottleneck in the market for fixed voice telephony, but is unlikely to be persistent in 
the broader relevant market that includes broadband Internet, and which feeds back 
into  the  voice  market  through  VoIP.  To  see  this,  note  first  that  it  is  beyond 
controversy that local access is becoming more important for economic activity on a 
broad scale, as is illustrated by applications and services that run over the Internet, e-
commerce, and also by the prospects of flexible homeworking to combat traffic jams. 
At  present,  there  already  exist  various  alternative  technologies  to  the  traditional 
copper lines of incumbents. Examples include cable, the third generation of mobile 
telephony, WiFi (in particular if hotspots are connected to create a local network), and 
wireless  local  loop.  In  many  cases,  cable  and  mobile  telephony  already  provide 
substitutes for end-users in the market for fixed telephony. More generally, while not 
all of the examples mentioned above have already been introduced or adopted, there is 
no reason to expect that none of them will become a serious alternative, especially 
since  broadband  applications  start  making  compelling  cases  for  more  ‘pipes’. 
Apparently, plain voice telephony just didn’t trigger cable operators (and others) to 
invest  or  upgrade  their  networks  and  make  them  available  for  two-way 
communication.  However,  with  the  emergence  of  ‘triple  play’  offerings,  that  is, 
bundles consisting of voice, television and Internet over a single connection, they will 
probably not want to miss the boat. Also, if firms do not invest themselves, end-users 
may  take  initiative  themselves,  such  as  the  development  of  a  community-based 
network  of  connected  WiFi  hotspots.
33  Accordingly,  it  seems  to  be  a  stretch  to 
continue to view the local loop as a persistent bottleneck in the broader market for 
fixed telecommunications services. The implication is that mandatory access regimes 
should gradually be withdrawn, so that entrants’ incentives to invest in local access 
networks are not distorted. Moreover, the emergence of competing networks implies 
that structural separation is losing its relevance in fixed telecommunications. 
 
                                                   
33 For an example, see http://www.wirelessleiden.nl/english/.   24 
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